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Aftermath of the Sirte Summit:  
Arab-African Cooperation on the Upswing?
Hanspeter Mattes
On October 10, 2010, in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte, the second Arab-African summit 
took place, more than 30 years after the first one. Numerous heads of state from the Ar-
ab League and the African Union took part in this joint conference.
Analysis
By the 1970s substantial Arab-African cooperation had already come into being and was 
institutionalized at the summit in Cairo in 1977. The goal was to bring about a balance 
of interests between Arab oil states that—thanks to OPEC’s petroleum revolution—ac-
quired substantial foreign currency revenue, and capital-poor, but resource- and water-
rich African states. With financial help from the Arab states, both the economic devel-
opment of Africa and the supply of food (the “breadbasket strategy”) and raw materi-
als from Africa to the Arab states would be effectuated.
The cooperative efforts were strained from the beginning because the Arab states 
hinged their financial and economic cooperative willingness—although unspo-
ken—on political factors (primarily on whether the African states supported their 
position on Israel).
Although the Arab-African cooperation was institutionalized in a way that made 
voting rights equally distributed, in fact it was de facto hierarchically organized. The 
Arab states were less committed to communal cooperation per se than they were to 
bilateral cooperative relationships, which they could have more control over.
The fresh start in Arab-African cooperation spurred by the conference in Sirte is in 
line with the old concept of “balance of interests” on an international level. 
The new strategic partnership will only last if the Arab states put an end to their po-
litical instrumentalization and cease pursuing goals of power politics.
Keywords: Arab League, African Union, development cooperation
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In recent years, the efforts at cooperation between 
continents and regional organizations have great-
ly increased. The European-African cooperation 
since the first, “historical” Europe-Africa summit 
in Cairo in 2000, the Europe-Latin America sum-
mits since 1999, and the summits between Latin 
American and Arab states since May 2005 are all 
testaments to that. In the midst of all this, Arab 
and African states have also experienced a reviv-
al in their relationship, whereby the expansion of 
economic cooperation with the goal of obtaining 
an interregional balance of interests is central.
Arab-African Cooperation: A Historical Overview
In recognition of the emerging crisis in develop-
ment politics, which began at the end of the first 
development decade and lasted until the begin-
ning of the 1970s, the developing countries called 
for strengthened “collective self-reliance” and an 
expansion of horizontal cooperation on an equal 
basis, concepts which, taken together, were sup-
posed to have abated the crisis. The OPEC coun-
tries’ 1973 petroleum revolution—which brought 
petroleum-producing countries a drastic surge in 
revenue, which in turn benefited the Arab League 
(AL) as well as the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU)—served to precipitate a successful cooper-
ation between the two regions. Because of the dif-
fering prerequisite conditions of each region, a dy-
namic development in cooperation was predicted, 
not only because there were historical ties, but al-
so because the complementarity of the economic 
factors (labor, fertile soil, and water in sub-Saha-
ran Africa, and capital in the Arab oil-producing 
states) was seen as advantageous (Neitzel/Nötzel 
1979; Haseeb 1985).
Furthermore, the collaboration benefited from 
a political factor: Starting after the Six-Day War in 
1967, the Near East conflict had an increasing in-
fluence on Arab-African relations. With the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973 and the related sporadic occu-
pation of African territory by the Israeli army, the 
conflict got a new focus. The OAU council of min-
isters spoke out against Israel in 1973, following 
which many African states broke off their once-
strong diplomatic ties with Israel. Oil played a 
central role in their decision; many African states 
had fears stemming from the petroleum revolu-
tion about whether their oil supply would be suf-
ficient and affordable. The political considerations 
of the African states necessitated their compli-
ance—African states supported the Arab states re-
garding Israel as a quid pro quo for securing both 
petroleum delivery and further Arab economic 
and financial aid. 
The framework for an institutionalization of 
Arab-African cooperation was outlined at vari-
ous AL and OAU congresses. These endeavors 
sparked not only the 1974 founding of certain de-
velopment agencies—such as the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)—and 
Arab funds for technical and financial help for the 
African states, but also the creation of political 
consultation structures (cf. Table 1), the latter of 
which were agreed upon at the first Arab-African 
summit in Cairo. 
The First Arab-African Summit (Cairo, March 1977)
Four declarations were adopted at the 1977 Cairo 
summit in the presence of numerous Arab and Af-
rican heads of state:
a political declaration that detailed a coopera-
tion based on the charters of both the OAU and 
the AL and that specified the reciprocal support 
for the liberation of Palestine and the abolition 
of Apartheid in Africa;
a program of action for Arab-African coopera-
tion that established sectoral cooperation;
a resolution entitled “Organization and Method 
for the Realization of Afro-Arab Cooperation”: 
this important document stipulated that the for-
eign ministers (the so-called “Joint Ministerial 
Council”) hold a summit every 18 months and 
that the heads of state do so every three years; 
furthermore, the document outlined the frame-
work for the so-called “Permanent Commis-
sion for Arab-African Cooperation” (PCAAC), 
a committee made up of 24 members (12 from 
the AL and 12 from the OAU), which was also 
supposed to convene every six months to su-
pervise the implementation of the agreed-upon 
resolutions;
a resolution on economic and financial cooper-
ation that de facto constituted a declaration of 
intent on the part of the Arabs to provide finan-
cial aid to the African states.
1)
2)
3)
4)
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At the end of the summit conference, it initially 
appeared as if Arab-African cooperation—if noth-
ing else, thanks to the generous financial help of 
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states—now had 
an effective incentive to work to avoid a relapse 
into the failures of earlier cooperation attempts. 
However, this optimism proved premature: var-
ious developments, starting at the latest in 1979 
and mostly relating to the Arabs, sabotaged the 
cooperation. Subsequently, plans for the second 
summit, supposed to take place in Kuwait in 1980, 
collapsed, and the second Arab-African summit 
did not end up taking place until 2010.
The Failure of Cooperation 
The cooperation failure of the 1970s can be as-
cribed to many different political and economic 
factors relating to both regional organizations. The 
most significant of those, however, was Egypt’s 
initiation of the peace process with Israel, which 
brought about the Camp David Accords and the 
subsequent suspension of Egypt from member-
ship in the AL, which also shifted its chair from 
Cairo to Tunis. Egypt’s conduct affected Arab-Af-
rican cooperation in that the majority of states in 
the OAU in fact also welcomed the peace process 
with Israel. The controversial Libyan military en-
gagement in Chad,1 the debate about Western Sa-
hara, and the Camp David Accords all served to in 
effect paralyze the OAU’s work at the beginning 
of the 1980s. Moreover, for the African states, the 
amount of economic and financial help from the 
Arab states was especially disappointing.2 Since 
1986 (at the latest), due to the international finan-
cial crisis that had arisen in the meantime, the 
drastic decline in oil prices, and the financial sit-
uation of the Gulf states caused by the 1991 Gulf 
1 Along those lines, there were also huge disagreements and 
much debate over Libya’s attempts to militarily instrumen-
talize the Arab-African cooperation in its pursuit of the “de-
struction of imperialism, racism and Zionism.”
2 Between 1975 and 1983 a total of 8.2 billion USD of Arab aid 
(subsidies and loans) flowed into African states; the amount 
was much lower than the African states had expected.
Table 1:   Important Dates in Arab-African Cooperation History
1973 Petroleum revolution
2/18/1974 Founding of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
3/1974 Founding of the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries 
(AFTAAC) and the Arab Fund for Financial Assistance to African Countries
4/19–22/1976 1st Arab-African foreign minister conference (Dakar)
3/3–6/1977 2nd Arab-African foreign minister conference (Cairo)
3/7–9/1977 1st Arab-African summit (Cairo); institutionalization of cooperation specified sum-
mit conferences every 3 years, joint foreign minister meetings every 18 months, 
meetings of the permanent committee (PCAAC) every 6 months; de facto, how-
ever, only 12 meetings in over 30 years
5/31–6/1/1977 1st PCAAC meeting; due to foreign policy differences, no regular meetings; for ex-
ample: 11th meeting 1991, 12th meeting 2001, 13th meeting 2009
1984 Institutionalization of Afro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue; so far 12 parliament 
meetings, most recently in April 2009 (Abuja)
10/22–31/1993 1st Arab-African trade fair (Tunis); 7 successive fairs had taken place as of 2010
2000–2009 Increasing demands of Arab and African states to revive the cooperation
9/24/2009 Arab-African minister meeting on Darfur
1/16/2010 Meeting of the joint AU/AL Secretariat; decision made to hold the 2nd Arab-
African summit
2/14–16/2010 1st Arab-African minister meeting on agriculture development and food security
3/4/2010 14th PCAAC meeting (Cairo)
7/6/2010 15th PCAAC meeting (Cairo)
10/1/2010 Arab-African Forum on Trade and Investment (Tripoli)
10/5/2010 1st Arab-African youth summit (Tripoli)
10/10/2010 2nd Arab-African summit (Sirte); date chosen by Libya for its symbolic significance
2013 3rd Arab-African summit planned for Kuwait
-  -GIGA Focus International Edition 6/010
War, the needs of sub-Saharan African states had 
been left unattended to. 
After the appeals by the African heads of state 
at the OAU summit conference in June 1981 in 
Nairobi for an “urgent intensification of Arab-Af-
rican cooperation” fell mostly on deaf ears, the en-
thusiasm for cooperation was markedly subdued 
and the intervals between PCAAC congresses be-
came increasingly longer.3
Causes of the Revival of Arab-African Cooperation
Many factors contributed to the attempts start-
ing at the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s 
to overcome the existing obstacles to Arab-Afri-
can cooperation. For one thing, despite the prob-
lems in the cooperative committees, some Arab 
countries—particularly Egypt, Algeria and Lib-
ya4—continued to maintain close relationships 
with sub-Saharan countries and thus became fa-
miliar with their development problems. Poverty-
induced migration, transborder criminality, coun-
terterrorism, the conflict in Darfur, and the issues 
surrounding the use of Nile water were just a few 
topics that made the benefits of a resumption of 
cooperation and a coordination of political action 
clear to both African and Arab states.
Within the AU5 as well as the AL there were 
many calls for the aforementioned cooperation 
and coordination. The calls came from, among 
others, the PCAAC, which met again in April 2001 
in Algiers for the first time in over ten years; the 
executive board of the AU (Maputo, July 2003); 
and the joint AU/AL Secretariat (Addis Ababa, 
May 2005 and December 2007). The cooperative 
endeavors became more intense particularly after 
2003, when a situation similar to that of the 1970s 
occurred: On one hand, the Arab (and this time 
also African) oil exporters experienced drastical-
ly increased petroleum prices and, accordingly, 
recorded high foreign currency earnings. On the 
other hand, numerous African nations had huge 
3 The African states’ financial crisis and debt problems were the 
reason that the cooperation with the AL was kept alive; cf. 
Chabar (1986).
4 Libya, in keeping with its attempts to persuade the UN to lift 
its sanctions, (which were based on its involvement in the 
Lockerbie plane crash), started in the 1990s to revise its for-
merly militant and expansionist policy on Africa. 
5 The OAU was disbanded in 2002 and the AU (African Union) 
was established as its successor organization.
6 See:  http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/council%2
0of%20minsters%20meetings/Maputo/EX_CL_Dec%2053.pdf>.
problems paying the ever more expensive energy 
import prices. Moreover, the Arab states demands 
for food imports increased greatly due to high 
population growth in Arab states, causing them to 
quickly and urgently reorient themselves towards 
“Breadbasket Africa,” which led to the first-ever 
“Africa-Arab Agro Investment Summit” in Zanzi-
bar, May 2009.7
In the face of global challenges, many heads of 
state believed the revival of Arab-African coop-
eration to be vital,8 and as a result both regions 
agreed to the proposal approved in January 2010 
by the joint AU/AL Secretariat to hold the long-
overdue second summit in the fall of 2010 in Libya.9
The Second Arab-African Summit  
(Sirte, Libya: October 2010)
The decision to hold the second summit entailed a 
succession of preparatory meetings:
The summit organization committee (with rep-
resentatives from Egypt, Algeria, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Kuwait, Tanzania as well as host-nation 
Libya) held gatherings. 
The PCAAC also met twice in Cairo (March 4 
and July 6, 2010).
A meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council took 
place on October 8 in Sirte, during which Ar-
ab and African positions on Sudan and Israel, 
as well as economic programs of action, among 
other topics, were discussed and the “Sirte Dec-
laration” was drafted.
The positions of both regional organizations were 
injected into the negotiations at different moments. 
While the AU had already formulated their objec-
tives at the end of July 2010 at their meeting in 
Kampala, the Arab heads of state did not convene 
until October 9, 2010, in Sirte, at a special session 
of the AL. Though the special session was trig-
7 Agenda at <www.fara-africa.org>; for more on the rent con-
troversy vis-à-vis the buying of agricultural land in Afri-
can states in order to supply food to Arab consumers, see: 
<http://farmlandgrab.org> (“Food Crisis and the Global Land 
Grab”).
8 An example would be Nigerian President Yar’Adua, who 
said as much in April 2009; cf. allafrica.com, accessed April 
22, 2009 (“Yar’Adua Urges Afro-Arab Cooperation on Glo-
balization Challenges”).
9 Prior to this, the PCAAC had proposed on the occasion of its 
13th congress in October 2009 that there be a summit; Libya 
assured all parties that it would foot the total bill for the con-
ference, thus winning the right to host. 
•
•
•
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gered by an Arab-specific cause, the summit also 
served as preparation for the Arab-African sum-
mit at which the Arab heads of state discussed the 
future of Sudan first and foremost.
These indispensable diplomatic-political prep-
arations were accompanied by many Arab-Afri-
can events; the goal of these events, which were 
organized and funded by Libya, was to strengthen 
Libya’s position in the Arab-African relationship 
network. Among these events were the first-ever 
Arab-African youth summit10 in Tripoli on Octo-
ber 5, 2010, and an Arab-African cultural confer-
ence at the end of October in Benghazi. 
Libya became heavily involved in economic top-
ics as well. Following the first Arab-African min-
ister meeting February 14–16, 2010, in Sharm-el-
Sheikh, Egypt—which dealt with agricultural co-
operation and food security (and during which the 
“Joint Plan of Action on Food Security for All” was 
passed)—Tripoli hosted an Arab-African trade fo-
rum at the end of September, and on October 2–3 
a conference took place there on the expansion of 
Arab-African trade and the investment capability 
of Arab investors in sub-Saharan African states. 
Results of the “10/10/10” Summit
Hosni Mubarak, the president of the first summit 
in Cairo in 1977, also opened the second summit, 
which was then led by revolutionary leader Qadd-
afi11 under the motto “Afro-Arab Cooperation: To-
wards a Strategic Partnership” and followed the 
procedure agreed upon by the organization com-
mittees. After substantial debate, and after having 
listened to speeches from AL General Secretary 
Amr Musa, Chairman of the Commission of the 
AU Jean Ping, and host Qaddafi, among others, 
the summit’s attendees, from approximately 60 
countries (among them 30 heads of state), passed 
the documents drafted by the foreign ministers.
The need for Afro-Arab cooperation was em-
phasized in the addresses from members of both 
sides, though from different perspectives. Even 
during President Mubarak’s opening remarks12 
was the acknowledgement of the importance of 
10 For more on the central topic of discussion, employment, see 
Tripoli Post, October 13, 2010 “Afro-Arab Youth Council De-
mands Empowerment.”
11 For more on the schedule and details of the summit and var-
ious related documents, see www.afro-arabsummit.com. In 
the German press, the high-profile summit was almost com-
pletely ignored
12 Nile News, October 10, 2010, according to the BBC (“Egypt 
Leader Calls for Active Arab-African Partnership”).
Arab-African cooperation clear: Mubarak said 
that he welcomed the revitalization of partnership 
in the form of new long-term strategies, includ-
ing a plan of action from 2011 to 201, and he si-
multaneously highlighted the sustained commit-
ment on the part of Egypt towards the rest of Afri-
ca. For their part, Amr Musa and Jean Ping voiced 
their appreciation of the positive steps made in 
the last three decades; they admitted to and ac-
knowledged the difficulties and problems of the 
past and called for a new page to be turned in joint 
relations. 
The changes in recent years would appear 
to have not only brought about an accelerated 
globalization but to have also shown that only 
strengthened cooperation on regional and interre-
gional levels can secure the welfare of all peoples. 
In that sense, the summit could be seen as overdue 
in demonstrating and channeling the new vigor 
of the interregional relationship. Jean Ping put 
the spotlight on economic collaboration and an-
nounced that the AU/AL Secretariat had decided 
to found an African-Arab chamber of commerce 
as well as the African-Arab Development Forum 
(as a discussion platform for questions of develop-
ment in regards to both regions).
In Qaddafi’s greatly anticipated speech, he em-
phasized that two-thirds of Arabs are also Afri-
cans and that, therefore, cooperation with the oil-
rich Arab states in West Asia has to be strength-
ened first and foremost. He spoke of the necessi-
ty not only for the Arab and African states to work 
together better within their own regional coali-
tions, but also for the AL and the AU to cooper-
ate more intensively with one another in the areas 
of politics, economics and security. He opined that 
only through that cooperation can peace and se-
curity prevail. Along those lines, Qaddafi not on-
ly deplored the lack of involvement, particularly 
of the rich Arab states, but also apologized for the 
disgraceful behavior towards the Africans, saying 
that the Arabs enslaved and exploited their Afri-
can brothers just as the Europeans did. “For that I 
am sorry and I regret these practices,” he said, af-
ter which he received a resounding round of ap-
plause from the audience.13
A second, much noted and commented-upon 
topic was the situation in Sudan; here, Qaddafi, 
in view of the imminent referendum, cautioned 
13 Libyan TV, October 10, 2010, according to the BBC (“Text 
of Libyan Leader’s Speech in Sirte During Arab-African 
Summit”).
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against a partition of the country because this step 
“could be a contagious disease that could infect 
the whole of Africa” and lead to war. The Afri-
can heads of state (from Nigeria, Chad, and else-
where)—just like the Arab heads of state did at the 
AL special session two days prior—openly recog-
nized this danger, and pleas for the preservation 
of territorial integrity in Sudan were thus incorpo-
rated into the official Sirte Declaration.14 The pre-
requisite for safeguarding territorial integrity is 
that the Arab states quickly fulfil their pledge to 
invest one billion USD into the economic develop-
ment of South Sudan.
Aside from 
Sudan, 
the dedication to peaceful methods of conflict 
settlement (for instance, regarding the redistri-
bution of Nile water and the conflict in Soma-
lia)15 and 
the combating of terrorism,1 the debate was 
dominated above all by development politics.
Predominantly, the development politics talk was 
more specifically about the concrete steps in co-
operation regarding water, energy, raw materials, 
food production and the environment. This co-
operation, according to Jean Ping, could only be 
made possible through the support of investors 
and trade; Ping clarified that African states should 
count on a substantial commitment (i.e. invest-
ments) from the richer Arab states. According to 
the finalized conference documents, while the Ar-
ab states did agree on the cooperative goals, the 
question of financing remains open.
 Two central documents were passed; the first, 
the “Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy,” comprised 
four aspects: 
peace and security, 
investment incentive and commercial ex-
change, 
agriculture and food security, and 
social and cultural cooperation. 
14 Tripoli Post, October 19, 2010 (“African-Arab Summit: No to 
Sudan Secession”); Sirte Declaration cf. Jananews, October 
12, 2010.
15 Panapress, October 12, 2010 (“Sirte Summit Calls for Cooper-
ation on Conflict Resolution”).
1 The coordination of counter-terrorism was endorsed by both 
sides and further steps were envisaged; in regards to the cur-
rent virulent Islamic terrorism in the Sahel, Qaddafi and the 
heads of state from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Chad met 
and came to an agreement on a further plan of action. See: 
L’Essor (Bamako), October 13, 2010 (“Mini-Sommet sur la sé-
curité”).
1)
2)
3)
1)
2)
3)
4)
The joint development goals are to be implement-
ed through political dialogue in the form of high-
ranking consultations and corresponding official 
talks conducted by a joint economic committee. 
The crux of the strategy is clarified in the sec-
ond document, the “Afro-Arab Joint Action Plan 
2011–2016.” This document served as a replace-
ment for the “Declaration and Program of Action 
on Afro-Arab Cooperation” from March 1977. The 
30-page plan of action for 2011 through 201 en-
compasses the specific measures that should be 
undertaken in the appropriate sectors—from the 
monitoring of investments, to the organizing of 
annual trade fairs, to the founding of the African-
Arab Institute for Strategic and Cultural Studies.
Both the Arab and African sides reacted posi-
tively overall to the summit, and this—for instance 
in the case of Senegalese President Wade and Li-
berian President Sirleaf—was partly tied to an ex-
plicit appreciation for Qaddafi’s commitment. As 
representatives from Zambia phrased it, “Libya is 
a power that must be recognized in Africa.”
The revitalization of Arab-African cooperation 
was welcomed and deemed necessary by all, and 
the desire to consolidate—the South African rep-
resentative went as far as to use the word “duty”—
was expressed. All delegations emphasized the mu-
tual benefits of cooperation, and the President of 
Congo-Brazzaville Denis Sassou Nguesso praised 
the summit for having “opened new doors” in the 
cooperation between Arab and African states. 
A few critical remarks came from the ranks of 
the Libyan opposition (“Just another waste of time 
and money”); for them, the summit was nothing 
more than a show, especially considering that no 
historical decisions could be expected in general 
from weak Arab rulers.
The Future of Arab-African Cooperation
Arab-African cooperation has been strained by 
two factors from the beginning. First, the Ar-
ab states have routinely made financial and eco-
nomic cooperation dependent on political factors. 
While the Arab states’ appeals for African support 
regarding Arab foreign interests were successful, 
it was not a genuine support and suggested more 
a conciliatory, opportunistic attitude on the part of 
the African states. In light of such an Arab-centric 
starting point for cooperation, from time to time 
and under certain circumstances, the will of the 
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Arab states to cooperate strongly waned when the 
support of the African states didn’t seem absolute-
ly necessary anymore.
Second, the Arab-African cooperation and re-
lationship in general lacked balance (read: equal-
ity). De facto hierarchically organized, the mone-
tary flow from Arab states into Africa was super-
vised by the AL and AU, but only moderately, and 
there was no way of really controlling the desti-
ny of the funding through the institutions of Ar-
ab-African cooperation; bilateral help became the 
preferred choice of the Arab states because it is 
and was easier to supervise. 
Arab-African cooperation, which in the 1970s 
set a precedent in South–South collaboration, has 
developed over time into a sort of Third World va-
riety of a North–South divide. Direct implications 
for the future of Arab-African cooperation can be 
observed. The future does look promising, provid-
ed the errors of the past can be avoided; i.e. the Ar-
ab states must stop politicizing and strive towards 
a real balance of interests. The signs of progress on 
that front were definitely apparent in the declara-
tions passed at the 2010 summit, but the Arab po-
liticization was already a point of contention at the 
first summit in 1977. The 2010 conference partici-
pants still supported the founding of a Palestini-
an state, but the Near East conflict overall played 
a much more subordinate role than it did in 1977. 
In at least this way, Arab-African cooperation was 
depoliticized. The benchmark for the new strate-
gic partnership remains the actions that, despite all 
intentions, will in all likelihood continue to lag be-
hind verbalized goals.
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